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Designing Security Requirements – A Flexible, Balanced, 
and Threshold-Based Approach 
 Yanjun Zuo 
University of North Dakota 
Grand Forks, ND 58201 
Email: yanjun.zuo@und.edu 
ABSTRACT 
Defining security requirements is the important first step in designing, implementing and evaluating a secure system. In this 
paper, we propose a formal approach for designing security requirements, which is flexible for a user to express his/her 
security requirements with different levels of details and for the system developers to take different options to design and 
implement the system to satisfy the user’s requirements.  The proposed approach also allows the user to balance the required 
system security properties and some unfavorable features (e.g., performance degrading due to tight control and strong 
security). Given the importance of social-technical factors in information security, the proposed approach also incorporates 
economic and organizational security management factors in specifying user’s security requirements. We demonstrate the 
application of our approach with the help of a concrete pervasive information system. 
Keywords 
Security, design, management, model, requirement analysis. 
INTRODUCTION 
Security requirement specification is a vital component in designing and implementing secure information systems 
(Tryfonas, 2007; Siponen, et al. 2006). Sound security requirements not only ensure that a system satisfying those 
requirements will provide secure functions in supporting an organization’s mission-critical services but also serve as a 
guideline for the users to evaluate, verify and ascertain that the system meet their expectations.  Given the critical role that 
security requirements play in information security, it is important to make sure that the security requirements are complete, 
consistent and analyzable by different actors involved in the development and use of the system (Mellado, et al. 2007). 
Although the importance of security requirements has been well recognized in the research community, there is still a need 
for a formal approach for designing security requirements with key features such as flexibility, expressiveness, soundness, 
and ease of use.  Our research in this paper presents a flexible, balanced, and threshold-based approach for designing security 
requirement. It offers a broader view of security requirements by including the socio-technical aspects of information security 
in security requirement specifications.  With infusion of more new services, technologies, and logical or physical devices to 
an organization’s information environment, no system can be completely secure (Straub and Welke, 1998). The security 
requirements as discussed in this paper not only include technical requirements but also organizational security management 
aspects (e.g., physical security - organization premise control, monitoring and auditing). 
The proposed approach has several unique features.  First of all, it is flexible for the user to express his/her security 
requirements with different levels of details and for the system developers to take different implementation options to satisfy 
the user’s requirements by considering various trade-offs between security compliance and economic factors (e.g., cost). 
Threshold selection operators are designed based on the utility theories to allow a subset of security properties to be satisfied 
before the system is considered satisfactory from a particular perspective. To our best knowledge, this work is the first of its 
kind in applying threshold operations in designing security requirements. 
Secondly, the proposed approach is comprehensive in the sense that it allows the user to balance both security requirements 
and some (unavoidable) concerns on certain system properties which may conflict with tight security control.  In engineering 
terms, more control means additional system layers.  More layers mean slower performance and higher implementation costs.  
The proposed approach allows the user to require that a system must meet the criteria for some mandatory, critical system 
security features. In the meantime, it will not have any unfavorable properties that cannot be tolerated. 
Thirdly, since the terminologies defined in this research (e.g., security characteristic and security primitive) have a general 
scope and are not limited to technical domains, a user can specify important social, economic, and managerial security 
requirements. As we mentioned earlier, given the growing importance of social-technical aspects of information security, the 
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approach allows the user to incorporate the economic and social factors in designing security requirements and allows 
flexibility in specifying security requirements based on economic factors and feasibility of technical implementations. 
Last but not least, since security compliance is critical in information security, the proposed approach supports “provability” 
– the system provider can compile and submit a proof to show that their system satisfies the user’s security requirements. We 
have already conducted some preliminary work in automatically constructing a compliance proof to indicate that a system 
meets the user’s criteria specified in the security requirements based on the approach presented in this paper. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section discusses related work. It is followed by the presentation of 
the security requirements design approach.  The manuscript concludes by summarizing the key techniques and unique 
features of this approach. 
RELATED WORK 
A considerable amount of research works have been published on security requirements elicitation, analysis, and engineering.  
We will only mention a few here. Myagmar, et al. (2006) discuss threat modeling as a basis of security requirements. They 
describe a systematic approach towards threat modeling for complex systems. The concept of risk management is also briefly 
explained. Oladimeji, et al. (2006) propose a goal oriented approach to security threat modeling and analysis by using visual 
model elements. They introduce the notions of negative softgoals for representing threats and inverse contributions for 
evaluating design alternatives. An analysis procedure is also provided as a guide to context sensitive selection of 
countermeasures. Haley et al. (2006) define security requirements as the implementation of security goals which constraint 
the functionality of a system. Fabian et al. (2010) present a conceptual framework for gathering, analyzing, and reconciling 
the functional and non-functional, and security requirements of a system. Their work establishes a clear-cut vocabulary and 
makes explicit the interrelations between the concepts and notions used in security requirements. Mellado, et al. (2007) 
present the security requirement engineering process to describe how to integrate security requirements into the software 
engineering process in a systematic and intuitive way. Young, et al. (2010) propose a holistic framework that incorporates 
security into the overall software development process instead of only addressing security during the requirement engineering 
process. Other approaches commonly used by IT security researchers and practitioners such as attack trees, misuse cases, and 
UMLSec are mainly to identify threats and security flaws. Our model takes a step further – it focuses on how security 
requirements after the threats/misuse cases have been identified can be formulated to address those concerns. In this regards, 
those security approaches and our model complement each other and achieve different objectives. 
In the literature, security requirements are also studied from different perspectives.  For instance, security requirements are 
expressed by describing the security mechanisms to be used (ISO/IEC, 1999), security requirements are processed as a kind 
of non-functional requirements (Devanbu & Stubblebine, 2000), described by how they may be violated (McDermott & Fox, 
1999), and defined as constraints on the functions of the system, where they operationalize one or more security goals (Haley, 
et al. 2006). In addition, several security requirement engineering approaches such as the Common Criteria, Secure Tropos, 
SREP, MSRA, and the methods based on UML have also been developed. 
Our research represented in this paper makes a significant contribution to the security requirements literature and to the field 
of developing secure systems in general by addressing several key issues which are not adequately addressed by the existing 
works.  We present a formal approach for systematic reasoning and specification of the security requirements.  Most of the 
existing security requirements frameworks do not consider potential conflicts between security and other functional and non-
functional requirements.  As we mentioned earlier, our approach offers several advantages: (1) it is flexible for the user to 
define security requirements and for the system developers to comply with the requirements; (2) it is cost effective, allowing 
different plans to define and comply with the security requirements based on economic factors and the feasibility of technical 
implementations; and (3) it is comprehensive by balancing both favorable and unfavorable system security features. 
THE EXAMPLE RFID SYSTEM 
An RFID system is used as a running example to illustrate our ideas.  We have chosen RFID because it is rapidly becoming 
an important part of enterprises and its security is getting more and more crucial for the success of this technology in business 
applications.  Although we use an RFID system as an example, our approach is general and can be applied to many other 
systems since no unique feature of RFID is specifically required to use the approach. The structure of a typical RFID system 
is shown in Figure 1 (Zuo, et al. 2009). The major components include: (1) the radio frequency (RF) subsystem, which 
consists of readers and tags to perform identification and wireless communications and transactions; (2) the enterprise 
subsystem, which consists of a backend database and a RFID server.  The database contains information such as tag 
identifications, the secret key shared with each tag, and detailed descriptions about the tagged items. The RFID server 
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consists of the necessary components to communicate with the readers and to process data acquired from the RF subsystem. 
The server is also connected to the higher-level business applications within the enterprise networks of an organization. 
 
Figure 1: RFID system components 
DESIGNING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
In this section, we first define the key terminologies and then discuss the techniques for designing security requirements. 
Terminologies 
Security Property Classification and Security Characteristics (SCs) 
The security properties of a system can be defined and classified from two technical and semantic aspects.  The former 
focuses on the intrinsic security features of the system and the latter focuses on favorable or unfavorable meanings of the 
system properties.  Some security properties describe the desired features of a system and they express a user’s expectations 
towards those favorable security features.  Examples include strong resilience to malicious attacks, solid fault tolerance and 
robustness, and prompt damage recovery.  Other system properties express a user’s concerns and wishes to minimize such 
properties of a system. One example would be system performance degrading.  Naturally, tight security control will 
unavoidably affect system performance.  In engineering terms, combining approaches leads to different trade-offs.  
Unfavorable properties refer to those types of security features that the user wants to limit but it is impossible or too costly to 
mitigate them. 
From the technical aspect, some security properties describe the security features of a system from the same perspective. 
Logically, they can be grouped into one dimension, called a security-related characteristic, or security characteristic (SC) for 
short. By its nature, security is a multi-faced concept and a system’s security properties can be described from different 
views.  For instance, robustness can be defined as an SC for an RFID system, which describes the security features of the 
RFID system from the perspective of how robust it is to tolerate malicious attacks and/or system failures. 
Security Characteristic Hierarchy, Basic Security Characteristic, and Security Primitive 
SC is a hierarchical concept - a parent SC (more abstract with a broader context) can be refined to multiple sub SCs (more 
specific with a more focused scope).  Consider the security characteristic “system robustness” (SC1) defined for the example 
RFID system. Three sub SCs may be defined for SC1: “damage masking” (SC1,1), “fault tolerance” (SC1,2) and “system 
adaptation” (SC1,3).  Each of them describes the RFID system’s security features from a more specific aspect of system 
robustness. Technically, each sub SC can be further refined to a set of more detailed sub SCs until a satisfactory level is 
achieved.  In this way, an SC hierarchy is formed from the root SC.  At the lowest level of the hierarchy, a set of basic SCs 
are obtained, which will not be further refined.  In the literature, some research work (Choobineh & Anderson, 2010) also 
proposes that security requirements are organized in a hierarchical structure where a more abstract higher-level node is 
broken down into details. 
SC refining can be function-based or component-based.  For the former, the sub SCs are refined based on the technical 
implications of the parent SC.  The above example of refining the security characteristic “robustness” (SC1) is function-based.  
In a different case, consider the security characteristic “fault tolerance” (SC1,2) which describes how an RFID system could 
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tolerate attacks or system failures in case those faulty conditions cannot be resisted.  As we discussed earlier, an RFID system 
consists of two major parts: enterprise sub-system and RF-subsystem.  Therefore, SC1,2 can be refined to two sub SCs: “RF 
subsystem fault tolerance” (SC1,2,1) and “enterprise subsystem fault tolerance” (SC1,2,2).  This is an example of component-
based SC refinement. 
The logical relationships among the sub SCs for a parent SC is either alternative or conjunctive.  For instance, the relationship 
among SC1,1 SC1,2 and SC1,3 as defined for “robustness” (SC1) is alternative in the sense that if a system has security features 
in terms of any one of the three, the system is considered satisfactory in terms of robustness (SC1).  In other words, SC1,1 
SC1,2, and SC1,3 can substitute each another.  For a conjunctive relationship, the sub SCs must be complementary in the sense 
that they all must be satisfied before the system can be considered as satisfactory in terms of the parent SC. For instance, 
“enterprise subsystem fault tolerance” (SC1,2,1) and “RF subsystem fault tolerance” (SC1,2,2) must both be satisfied before the 
RFID system as a whole is considered fault tolerant. Therefore, SC1,2,1 and SC1,2,2 have a logical “composite” relationship in 
the context of their parent SC1.2 i.e., “system fault tolerance”. 
As we mentioned earlier, a basic SC represents the smallest unit of “aspect” or “perspective” to describe a system’s security 
features. The concrete, specific security properties can be defined from the perspective of each SC. We name such a security 
property as security primitive (SP) since it represents the most primitive security property to describe a concrete system 
security feature. For instance, if “redundancy-based damage masking” is refined as a basic SC (SC1,1,1) in the SC hierarchy 
discussed above, two SPs may be defined from this perspective of damage masking: (1) service redundancy; and (2) 
component redundancy and system partition. We can see that both of the two SPs are within the context of SC1,1,1 since they 
both describe the security properties from the perspective of redundancy-based damage masking.  More examples of basic 
SCs and their respective SPs can be found in Table 1. 
Balancing Favorable and Unfavorable System Security Properties 
From the semantic perspective, an SC is called a favorable (unfavorable, resp.) SC if it describes desirable (undesirable, 
resp.) security properties of a system. We require that a favorable (unfavorable, resp.) SC only contains favorable 
(unfavorable, resp.) sub SCs and security primitives (SPs)1. A favorable SC represents a user’s overall expectations towards 
some desired security features of the system from a particular perspective. Any system to meet the user’s requirements must 
possess those required favorable features.  In the meantime, the user may also specify some unfavorable SCs to describe 
potential unwanted features of the system.  Those unfavorable features of a system, if any, must not go below a minimum 
acceptable level in order for the system to be acceptable.  In the next section, we use the RFID example to show how the 
user’s security requirements are defined by balancing both favorable and unfavorable system features. 
Designing Security Requirements 
The major steps of designing security requirements include: (1) specifying the high-level SCs that represent the most general 
and containable perspectives to describe security properties of a system. If the system satisfies the requirements in terms of 
those SCs, it is considered to have a certain level of security; (2) refining each high-level SC to a set of more specific sub SCs 
until a desired level of detail is reached and a set of basic SCs are defined; and (3) specify the corresponding SPs for each 
basic SC. A threshold structure is defined for each basic SC to express the user’s requirement in terms of the basic SC using 
those SPs.  In the next two sub sections, we will discuss those steps in detail using the RFID example. 
Specifying Security Requirements in Terms of Security Characteristics (SCs) 
The basic principles of defining high-level SCs include: (1) the defined SCs are comprehensive – they cover all the vital 
perspectives from which the system security properties need to be addressed; (2) the defined SCs balanced – both favorable 
and unfavorable aspects of the system’s security-related properties need to be specified; and (3) the defined SCs are 
appropriate – the depth (detail) and breadth (scope) of refining those SCs reflect the technical and business requirements of 
the organization and its mission. In general, if a system satisfies the security properties in terms of those SCs, then the system 
is considered with the desired level of security.  For instance, in order for the RFID system to be considered reaching a high 
level of security, three SCs are defined (see Figure 2): “system robustness” (SC1), “resilience” (SC2), “intrusion detection and 
response” (SC3), and “concerns on system performance degrading” (SC4). The first three represent favorable SCs and the last 
one represents an undesired SC. Those four SCs represent the user’s high-level vision of a “secure” RFID system. 
                                                          
1
 Technically, one SC can always be broken into two SCs so that each only contains the sub SCs and SPs with the same type of semantics (favorable or 
unfavorable). 
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Table 1: Security Primitives (SPs) Defined for the Basic Security Characteristics (SCs) as Shown in Figure 3 (a)-(d) 
Security Primitive (SP) The Basic SC To which 
it Belongs 
Explanations of the SP 
SP1: Service redundancy RFID system’s ability to strategically duplicate services to mask damage 
SP2: Component 
redundancy 
Redundancy based 
damage masking 
(SC1,1,1) 
RFID system’s ability to strategically duplicate critical components and partition the system, and,  if 
necessary, to provide damage masking 
SP3:Process mitigation RFID system’s ability to transfer the processes that support critical services from compromised 
components to other clean and safe components in face of attacks 
SP4:Component/service 
distribution ability 
RFID system’s ability to deploy the critical components and services in a distributed model to avoid 
single-point failures and to increase system damage masking ability 
SP5:Interoperability The ability of the RFID system’s services/components to interoperate with each other 
SP6:Connectivity RFID system’s ability to maintain its components connected in a hostile environment 
SP7:Scalability 
 
 
Service mitigation 
(SC1,1,2) 
RFID system’s ability to spread the services in a large scale to avoid vulnerable points 
Robustness 
(SC1) Intrusion 
Detection & 
Response 
(SC3) 
RFID High 
Security Level 
Resilience  
(SC2) 
Concerns on 
Performance 
Degrading 
(SC4) 
Fig. 2: The High-Level Security Characteristics 
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ltso(1, [SP14, 
SP15]) 
 
ltso (2, 
[SP12, SP13]) 
 
ltso(3, [SP3], 
[SP3, SP4, 
SP5, SP6,P7]) 
 
Fig. 3 (b): The Hierarchy of the Security Characteristic “Robustness” 
including the Security Primitives for each Basic SC 
Fault 
Tolerance 
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Adaptation 
(SC1,3) 
Enterprise 
Subsystem 
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Component 
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Communi
cation FT 
(SC1,2,1,2) 
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ation FT 
(SC1,2,1,1) 
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utso(1,  
[SP44, SP45]) 
 
utso(2, [SP41], [SP41, 
SP42, SP43]) 
 
Fig. 3 (a): The Hierarchy of the Security Characteristic 
“Tolerable Performance Degrading” including the Security 
Primitives for each Basic SC 
Fig. 3 (c): The Hierarchy of the Security Characteristic “Resilience” 
including the Security Primitives for each Basic SC 
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Fig. 3 (d): The Hierarchy of the Security Characteristic “Intrusion 
Detection & Response” including the Security Primitives for each Basic SC 
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SP8: Proxy-based 
authentication fault 
tolerance 
RFID RF subsystem’s ability to provide fault tolerable component authentications through proxy service, 
e.g., a more powerful mediation device conducts authentication with external devices on behalf of the RF 
components (e.g., RFID tags) 
SP9: Protocol fault 
tolerance 
RF subsystem 
authentication fault 
tolerance (SC1,2,1,1) 
 RFID RF subsystem’s ability to provide fault tolerant tag/reader authentication protocols (e.g., robust to 
desynchronization, signal blocking, bogus data injection attacks) 
SP10: Proxy-based 
communication fault 
tolerance 
RFID RF subsystem’s ability to conduct fault tolerant inter-components communications through proxy 
service, e.g., a more powerful mediation device communicates with external devices on behalf of the RF 
components (e.g., RFID tags) 
SP11: Anti-interference 
Communication fault 
tolerance (SC1,2,1,2) 
RFID RF subsystem’s ability to counter communication interferences by attackers (e.g., single jamming, 
collision, or blocking) 
SP12: Endurability RFID enterprise subsystem’s built-in capability to endure internal and external faults 
SP13:Self-healing 
Enterprise subsystem 
fault tolerance (SC1,2,2) RFID enterprise subsystem’s ability to promptly repair and recover damages due to attacks or system 
failures in support of fault tolerance 
SP14: Distance sensitive 
authentication & responses 
RFID RF subsystem’s ability to adjust its components’ behaviors (for the purposes of authentication & 
query response) according to the physical distance to the querying entities. For instance, RFID tags may 
respond differently according to the distance to the querying entities by measuring the signal strengths  
SP15: Component 
reconfiguration 
RF subsystem 
adaptation (SC1,3,1) 
RFID RF subsystems’ ability to reconfigure the components to adapt to the changing environment (e.g., 
an RFID tag can be put into sleep, temporarily deactivated, or working in a degraded mode in a hostile 
environment) 
SP16: Reconfigurability The ability of the major components of the RFID enterprise subsystem to be reconfigured 
SP17: Context awareness RFID enterprise subsystem’s ability to sense the dynamically changing environment 
SP18: Static adaptation RFID enterprise subsystem’s ability to adapt to environment based on pre-defined rules 
SP19: Dynamics 
 
Enterprise subsystem 
adaptation (SC1,3,2) 
RFID enterprise subsystem’s ability to automatically reconfigure its major components and/services and 
to dynamically adapt to the changing environment 
SP20: Anti-spoofing RFID system’s ability to resist spoofing and impersonation attacks 
SP21: Anti-traffic analysis RFID system’s ability to resist traffic analysis (e.g., communication anonymity) 
SP22: Authentication 
soundness 
RFID system’s ability to correctly accept legitimate components and reject any non-self or suspicious 
components 
SP23: Time sensitive 
authentication 
RFID system’s ability to resist relay attacks by deploying time sensitive authentication protocols and 
procedures (e.g., a timer is used to measure the response duration) 
SP24: Distance bounding 
authentication 
 
Strong system 
authentication/ 
authorization ability 
(SC2,1) 
RFID system’s ability to resist relay attacks by deploying distance bounding authentication protocols and 
procedures (e.g., signal strength is used to estimate the querying partner’s distance) 
SP25: Tamper resilience Component physical 
security  (SC2,2,1) 
RFID components’ ability to physically protect themselves using mechanisms such as tamper-proof 
hardware/software, password protection and physical unclonable functions 
SP26: Component 
traceability 
RFID system’s ability to track critical components physically and to search for possible missing 
components (e.g., RFID tags and readers) 
SP27: Environment 
monitoring and control 
 
Physical access control 
(SC2,2,2) RFID system’s ability to deploy surveillance devices to monitor its components behaviors and physically 
control access to critical components in an organization premise 
SP28: Software assurance RFID system hardening through sound software engineering practices with solid software design, testing, 
verification, and analysis  
SP29: Vulnerability control 
System hardening 
(SC2,3) 
RFID system hardening through threat modeling, vulnerability identification and mitigation, system 
patching, and update management  
SP30: Fault traceability RFID system’s ability to detect and trace system abnormal behaviors which may represent the symptoms 
of malicious attacks and/or system failures in their early stages 
SP31: Testability 
Intrusion detection 
(SC3,1) 
RFID system’s ability to test and verify system abnormal behaviors and conduct the corresponding 
diagnosis and fault analysis 
SP32: Data verifiability RFID system’s ability to verify data integrity 
SP33: Component searching 
ability 
RFID system’s ability to search for missing components (e.g., RFID tags and readers) and to verify the 
security status of the critical components 
SP34: Server auditability & 
impact evaluation 
 
Damage assessment 
(SC3,2) 
RFID system’s ability to audit server status and to perform impact analysis in case that some servers may 
have been compromised 
SP35: Tag reset RFID RF subsystem’s ability to reprogram, reset, or reconfigure tags 
SP36: Reader repairability RFID RF system’s ability to repair RFID readers if they are damaged 
SP37: State 
resynchronization 
 
RF subsystem 
recoverability (SC3,3,1) RFID RF system’s ability to resume the states of tags and readers in case of state been desynchronization 
resulted from malicious actions such as a denial of service attack 
SP38: Restorability RFID enterprise subsystem’s ability to restore damaged components/services to their pre-attack clean 
states 
SP39: Predictability RFID enterprise subsystem’s ability to predict possible causes of damage and/or the techniques used by 
the attackers in order to quickly recover the compromised components in case of an actual attack case 
SP40: Reusability 
 
Enterprise subsystem 
recoverability (SC3,3,2) 
The ability of the RFID enterprise subsystem’s components to be reused to provide similar functions (it is 
desired that the components are multi-functional and compatible with others) 
SP41: Computation 
accuracy degrading 
User’s concern on RFID system’s degrading acceptable computation accuracy (given the more resources 
deployed for security, computation accuracy could be degraded)  
SP42: Service consistency 
concern 
User’s concern on the acceptable level of service consistency provided by the RFID system 
SP43: Resource allocation 
fairness concern 
 
Operation concerns 
(SC4,1) 
User’s concern on a reasonable level of fairness in resource allocations to different services/functions 
(since more resources may be dedicated to security) 
SP44: Transmission delay 
concern 
User’s concern on RFID data/service transmission delays 
SP45: Service availability 
concern 
Communication 
concerns (SC4,2) 
User’s concern on RFID system service availability 
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To make a balance between the favorable security features and some unfavorable features of a system, the user may require 
that the system must have at least certain “strong” security properties in terms of some crucial (favorable) SCs but at the same 
time the undesirable security-related features in terms of other non-crucial unfavorable SCs are not below a tolerable level. 
Flexibility is desired to allow for a limited number of non-critical unfavorable features of a system to be accepted as long as 
the system possesses other significant and critical security features.  For the RFID system, it satisfies the user’s requirements 
with a “high level of security” if it meets the following three critical criteria (see Figure 2): (1) it is resilient to most of the 
malicious attacks (SC2); (2) it is robust to mask damage and/or tolerate fault if the attacks cannot be resisted (SC1); and (3) it 
has strong intrusion detection and incident response ability to recover damage (SC3). Those three SCs represent the user’s 
expectations towards the necessary favorable security features that the RFID system must have. At the same time, the user 
may require the system’s possible performance degrading must not go below a minimum tolerable level represented by SC4. 
After the high-level SCs are specified, the user’s security requirements can be further refined to different levels of sub SCs 
until a set of basic SCs is reached.  Each basic SC represents the most preliminary perspective (or dimension) to describe the 
security properties of a system.  To illustrate, we show the SC hierarchy for each of the three high-level security 
characteristics SC1 – SC4 in Figure 3 (a), (b), (c), and (d), respectively (the meaning of each SP is explained in Table 1).  We 
call such a hierarchy structure a security requirement tree. The relationship of the sub SCs within the context of a parent SC 
is represented by an “AND” or “OR” symbol in a security requirement tree, representing the conjunctive and alternative 
relationship, respectively. As we can see, “resilience” (SC2) is refined to three sub SCs: “strong authentication/authorization” 
(SC2,1), “physical security” (SC2,2), and “system hardening” (SC2,3).  SC2,2 is further refined to two sub SCs: “component 
physical security” (SC2,2,1) and “physical environment access control & monitoring” (SC2,2,2). Finally four basic SCs are 
obtained from SC2: SC2,1, SC2,2,1, SC2,2, 2, and SC2,3.  In the next sub section, we discuss how the user’s security requirement is 
defined in terms of those basic SCs. 
Security Requirement Specification in Terms of Security Primitives (SPs) 
As we mentioned earlier, a set of security primitives (SPs) are defined in the context of each basic SC.  An SP represents a 
concrete security property to describe the system’s security features from a specific perspective of that SC.  Table 1 shows 45 
SPs defined for the 16 basic SCs for the RFID example. In our approach, the user’s security requirements in terms of a basic 
SC are represented by the requirements in terms of the SPs defined for the SC.  More specifically, a threshold selection 
structure is defined for each basic SC to indicate that a subset of SPs must be satisfied before the system is considered 
satisfactory in terms of that SC. We first use an example to illustrate the idea and then explain the rationale of developing 
such a threshold approach.  
Consider the basic SC “strong authentication/authorization” (SC2,1) as represented in Figure 3(c). Five SPs are defined for 
SC2,1: “anti-spoofing” (SP20), “anti-traffic analysis” (SP21), “soundness of tag/reader authentication protocols” (SP22), “time 
sensitive-enabled authentication” (SP23), and “distance bounding-enabled authentication” (SP24). To satisfy the user’s security 
requirements for strong authentication/authorization (SC2,1), a system must satisfy SP20-SP22 since each of them is critical. 
But only one of SP23 and SP24 is required since those two SPs represent the complementary or replaceable security features, 
i.e., the RFID system only needs to have either time sensitive or distance bound authentication protocols to provide strong 
authentication/authorization to prevent such attacks as relay, replay or man-in-the-middle. 
To represent the above idea, a low bound threshold operator ltso(j, MLj=[SPj,…, SPk], SPLj=[SP1, SP2, …, SPn]) is defined 
for a favorable basic SC to indicate that a system must satisfy at least j out of n SPs in SPLj, among which all the SPs in MLj 
(MLj⊆ SPLj) must be satisfied. If that is the case, the system is considered as satisfying the user’s requirements in terms of 
SC.  Using the notation of threshold selection structure, the requirements for SC2,1 as shown in the above example can be 
represented by ltso(4, [SP20, SP21, SP22], [SP20, SP21, SP22, SP23, SP24]). 
Theoretical Foundation for Defining Low Bound Threshold Operator 
Requiring only a subset of SPs for each basic SC is based on the Utility Fusion Theory (Zuo & Panda, 2008), which is further 
based on the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility (Greene & Baron, 2001). Basically, the law states that the marginal utility 
of any good or service decreases as the quantity of the good increases.  The law is expressed from the viewpoint of a 
consumer, and is a general principle of economics. The Utility Fusion Theory expresses a similar idea but was developed for 
the evaluation of an intellectual object (e.g., a piece of information or knowledge in various forms such as a data item or a 
file) from different perspectives (called dimensions).  Basically, the theory indicates that the aggregated utility that an 
evaluator measures in terms of a dimension as a whole is less than the sum of all the component attribute utilities in that 
dimension. More specifically, the Utility Fusion Theory is expressed as: the utility for an attribute dimension D integrated 
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from a set of component utilities based on the attributes A1, …, An of D is less than the mathematical addition of those 
component utilities, i.e., U(D) ≤  
∑
=
=
ni
i
iAU
1
)( , where U(.) represents an utility function. 
Based on the above theories and when applied to our model, for a basic SC, incorporating any more SPs may only contribute 
a decreasing margin to the total utility for that SC. In other words, those additional SPs will not add much more utility. 
Therefore, as long as the accumulated utility based on the chosen subset of SPs is good enough, the user may consider that 
the security features of the system are acceptable from the viewpoint of that SC. Given the complexity of modern systems 
and variety of usage scenarios, it is desired to have flexibility in defining user’s security requirements and to allow the system 
developers to choose different options to satisfy the user’s requirements by meeting the criteria of their chosen SPs.  
For an undesirable security characteristic SC’, a upper-bound threshold selection operator, denoted as utso(i, MLi=[SPt, …, 
SPq], SPLi=[SP1, SP2, …, SPm]) is defined, which indicates that the system must not have serious concerns for more than i 
out of m SPs defined in SPLi, among which all SPs in MLi must not be seriously concerned. Essentially, utso(.) defines the 
“most tolerable” upper bound for possible unfavorable features of a system, indicating a “better than minimum” acceptable 
criteria in evaluating the system’s security-related features from the point of view of SC’. As we mentioned before, since it is 
impossible to have a perfectly secure system, it may be necessary to allow for some controlled non-critical unfavorable 
features of a system to be accepted under the condition that the system possesses other significant and critical positive 
survivability features. 
As an example, consider an unfavorable security characteristic SC4,1 (see Figure 3 (a)), which represents the user’s concerns 
on system operation degrading. Three SPs are defined: computation accuracy concern (SP41), service consistency concern 
(SP42), and resource allocation fairness concern (SP43).  A threshold selection structure ulto(2, [SP41], [SP41, SP42, SP43]) is 
defined for SC4.1.  To satisfy this structure, the system first must not have any unacceptable property defined by SP41-SP43.  
For instance, a system must not have unacceptable level of computation accuracy or unacceptable service consistency.  If the 
system cannot meet this criterion, it is considered unsatisfactory in terms of the entire SC.  But, even the system marginally 
meets those requirements (e.g., it offers a minimum level of acceptable computation accuracy, has a minimum level of 
service consistency, and provides a barely acceptable resource allocation fairness – all those may be caused by excessive 
allocations of resources to security functions), it still does not satisfy the user’s requirement for a “highly secure” system 
(particularly when a balanced approach for service quality is concerned).  Essentially, ulto(2, [SP41], [SP41, SP42, SP43]) 
requires that a satisfactory system must not have concern for SP41 (i.e., it must have a above-minimum level of computational 
accuracy) and has a “better than minimum” security feature in terms of either SP42 or SP43.  utso(.) is defined to indicate that 
the system should not have too many “boundary” security-related features in order to address the user’s concern for a high-
grade system. 
The Master Security Requirement Tree 
Figure 2 and 3 (a)-(d) denote the user’s security requirements for the RFID system at different level of details represented by 
the corresponding SC hierarchies. Logically, those trees can be combined to form a comprehensive hierarchy structure to 
represent the user’s overall security requirements for the RFID system, called a master security requirement tree T (due to 
page limitation, we will not show the complete tree here).  The root of T represents the desired security level. An intermediate 
node represents an SC. Each leaf node represents the user’s security requirements in terms of a basic SC, i.e., the threshold 
selection structure op(j, MLj, SPLj), where op represents a threshold selection operator ltso(.) or ulso(.).  As we can image, T 
clearly specifies the user’s security requirements from different perspectives with different levels of details.  If a system 
satisfies all the requirements specified in T, then it is considered reaching a certain level of security as specified by the user. 
Since we have presented all the individual components of a master security requirement tree, we will not discuss it further. 
Discussions 
The proposed approach provides a way for the users to incorporate their particular needs in defining security requirements. It 
also offers a considerable degree of flexibility at the system implementation level when the security options need to be 
chosen to carry out the security plan. To apply our approach, the users need to apply their domain knowledge to identify the 
favorable and unfavorable features of a system, the relative importance of those features, and their expectations for those 
features (e.g., the parameters in a threshold structure can be adjusted to customize the users’ different levels of expectations). 
This work contributes to the security requirement research in the literature by proposing a flexible and balanced approach in 
specifying security requirements.  However, there are two major issues which remain unsolved and we will address in our 
future work. First of all, we assume that a security primitive can be either fully satisfied or not satisfied at all.  However, in 
many cases it is unrealistic to make such a binary judgment. We plan to introduce the concept of “fuzzy satisfaction” for the 
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case when a system has certain features which partially satisfy the users’ requirements in terms of a security primitive.  
Another issue we plan to address is the inter-dependencies of a subset of security primitives in a security characteristic. For 
instance, some security primitives may functionally depend on others and they must be all satisfied in the mean time when a 
security characteristic is considered.  Developing a systematic approach to incorporate those non-trivial inter-dependency 
relationships in security requirement specification is needed. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we proposed a formal approach for designing security requirements.  Different from the existing research 
works, our approach allows a user to specify his/her security requirements with different levels of details.  The approach also 
allows the user not only to specify the required security features but also to address his/her concerns towards some 
unfavorable system properties which are either unavoidable or too costly to mitigate.  Since a threshold approach is used, 
flexibility is also achieved for the system developers to design and implement the system with possible different features but 
still satisfying the user’s security requirements.  We have shown how to apply the proposed approach using an RFID system. 
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